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Of Course, More Than Words
C. Edwin Bakert
Only Words. Catharine A. MacKinnon. Harvard, 1993. Pp v, 152.
Campaigning to make pornography illegal, Catharine
MacKinnon targets free speech. At least, Only Words takes aim
at any view of free speech that treats pornography as consti-
tutionally protected. Her justification is equality, that is, a theory
of equality that she finds undermined by pornography. She ar-
gues that the "law of equality and the law of freedom of speech
are on a collision course in this country" (p 71),' and she makes
clear which should be crushed.
MacKinnon's insistence on a conflict between free speech (or
liberty) and equality is a common one on the left. A typical view
is that radical democracy "affirms ... the unresolvable tension
between the principles of equality and liberty.... . 2 Neverthe-
t Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania School of Law. I have benefited, al-
though they might think not enough, from the comments of Fritz Kubler, Carol Sanger,
Steve Shiffrin, and Susan Sturm, as well as the editors of this Review.
There is an ambiguity as to whether Macinnon views speech and equality as
inevitably in conflict or whether she would avoid the conflict by reinterpreting free speech
through an equality lens. At one point, MacKinnon explained:
If you look at the First Amendment properly, you may not ultimately have this con-
flict. But because the First Amendment has not been seen properly, we've got a con-
flict .... A First Amendment properly understood ... would also recognize that to
violate someone, to subordinate someone, to abuse someone, to rape someone are not
First Amendment-protected activities.
Dialogue: Floyd Abrams, Catharine MacKinnon, Anthony Lewis, The First Amendment,
Under Fire From the Left, NY Times Magazine 40, 56, 71 (Mar 13, 1994).
2 Stated more fully, radical democracy "affirms that the unresolvable tension be-
1181
The University of Chicago Law Review
less, like various thoughtful leftist critiques of traditional speech
doctrine, MacKinnon provides glimmers of a design for recon-
structing the law of free speech so that it does not allow practices
that "silence" the oppressed. These claims are sensible.
MacKinnon's constitutional views have substantial pedigree and
are preferable to the positions she attributes to mainstream
constitutional doctrine. Nevertheless, I will suggest that an
alternative constitutional interpretation in which there is no
collision between free speech and equality is both preferable to
and more radically democratic than either her approach or other
similar theories that assert that these two constitutional norms
conflict.
MacKinnon's most contentious position in recent years has
been her claim concerning the role of "pornography" in the op-
pression of women.' According to MacKinnon, as a central prac-
tice in the institutionalization of male supremacy, pornography
silences women, constructs who women are for men, and causes
men to engage in violence and discrimination that determines the
status of women.4 Her view has been widely and, I think, effec-
tively contested, especially by radical feminists.' This Review
will not add to that discussion. Rather, my more limited goal is
tween the principles of equality and liberty is the very condition for the preservation of
the indeterminacy and undecidability which is constitutive of modem democracy."
Chantal Mouffe, ed, Dimensions of Radical Democracy 13 (Verso, 1992).
' MacKinnon often presents her argument through definitional assertions. Although
she complains that critics mistake her claims as metaphorical (p 11), it is often hard to
take them literally. For example, according to MacKinnon, "[wihen words of sexual abuse
are in [women's] mouths, that is pornography, and [the speakers] become pornography
because that is what pornography is" (p 66). In describing the confirmation hearings of
Justice Thomas, MacKinnon notes that Anita Hill unhappily had to repeat the "words of
sexual abuse" that Thomas had said to her (pp 65-66). Taking MacKinnon literally, that
makes Professor Hill pornography. Elsewhere, MacKinnon explains that "[plornography is
masturbation material" (p 17), and that "of all two-dimensional forms of sex, it is only
pornography... that gives men erections" (p 16). Moreover, "the physical response to por-
nography is nearly a universal conditioned male reaction" (p 37). Despite her definitions
and empirical claims, I doubt that MacKinon believes that men all over the country
masturbated while watching Professor Hill in the hearings. But at what point was the
reader not supposed to take MacKinnon literally?
Surely MacKinnon's rhetoric will bother many resistent readers. Compare Marjorie
Heins, Sex, Sin, and Blasphemy 158-59 (New Press, 1993) (MacKinnon's "emotionally
charged rhetoric is the language of religious conversion").
" This account is most succinctly developed in Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a
Feminist Theory of the State 195-214 (Harvard, 1989).
' See, for example, Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-
Suppression, 72 Tex L Rev (1994) (forthcoming). Nadine Strossen provides an excellent
catalogue of feminist arguments against censoring pornography in A Feminist Critique of
"The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 Va L Rev 1099, 1140-84 (1993).
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to describe and dispute the constitutional theories of speech and
equality that MacKinnon offers in Only Words.
I. THE WRONG VIEW OF SPEECH AND OF EQUALITY
MacKinnon resolutely attacks the classic marketplace-of-
ideas rationale for protecting speech-the "faith that truth will
prevail if left alone" (p 75). This theory calls only for a negative
interpretation of free speech (p 73), since "[t]he evil to be avoided
is government restricting ideas" in the struggle of "intellectual
persuasion" (p 75). Any harm resulting from mistakes is best
corrected through more speech, exchanged in the marketplace of
ideas (p 76). After all, because speech amounts to communicating
either good or misguided ideas, the only harm communication
can cause is "offense" (p 11). In contrast to harms that result
from acts, offense is a minor harm that society must tolerate in
order to obtain the benefits of free speech.
The classic marketplace-of-ideas theory of speech should be
rejected for at least the two reasons MacKinnon emphasizes.
First, speech is not merely a matter of ideas, and any theory that
treats it as such is inadequate. People use speech to do things,
from the institutionally bound, legally supported practices of
making a contract or exercising authority to the often unbound
cultural activities of creating or changing the social world.
"Speech acts" (p 30). And in this "acting" speech can be harmful.
It can even be a method of engaging in criminal acts-everything
from bribery to murder (pp 12-13). Second, related to this "act"
quality of speech is the notion that speech often creates society's
operative truth rather than merely discovering objective truth,
and that those most able to speak will create their preferred
truths. "[So-called speech can be an exercise of power which con-
structs the social reality in which people live. . ." (pp 30-31).'
The marketplace theory wrongly assumes that reality is ration-
ally discovered, presumably irrespective of how speech opportu-
nities are distributed. Instead, reality is created, in part through
speech and in a manner directly related to the distribution of
power.
The classic marketplace-of-ideas theory and the resulting
speech doctrine are coherent if truth is objective and rationality
6 MacKinnon properly adds: "Words and images are how people are placed in hierar-
chies .... Social supremacy is made, inside and between people, through making mean-
ings" (p 31). However, her failure to distinguish between social construction and more
direct action is problematic. See text accompanying notes 57-59.
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dominates discourse. But since truths are socially constructed
and power, not logic, largely determines their content,
MacKinnon persuasively argues that the existing "doctrinal edi-
fice [has not] guaranteed free and equal speech" (p 77). Specifi-
cally, speech doctrine has not guaranteed equal participation in
the arenas in which social construction occurs. Rather, censorship
today occurs mostly "through official and unofficial privileging of
powerful groups and viewpoints" and "through silencing in many
forms" (p 77)7 But these are problems that radical change could
correct, suggesting that a revised form of the marketplace-of-
ideas theory could survive in MacKinnon's affirmative vision.
In contrast to her telling but ultimately sympathetic critique
of the marketplace-of-ideas theory of free speech, MacKinnon
ridicules and dismisses a second approach that she calls "First
Amendment absolutism," a view "that whatever is expressive
should be constitutionally protected" (p 89). Theoretical accept-
ance of this second approach (as she describes it) would justify
her claim that "speech theory never says why [rape and murder
are] not [protected expression]" (p 30) and her assertion that,
since "[1lynching expresses a clear point of view (p 34)," "existing
speech theory" does not explain why it is not protected (p 35).
MacKinnon, of course, agrees that these acts are expressive-but
being expressive does not make them any less acts that should be
regulated (pp 29-30). "Crossburning is nothing but an act, yet it
is pure expression.. . " (p 33).'
This attack on "absolutism" recurs in various guises. Accord-
ing to MacKinnon, Judge Easterbrook protected pornography in
American Booksellers Ass'n v Hudnut,9 despite the carnage that
it assertedly causes (p 37), because it contains "mental elements"
(p 94). But, according to MacKinnon, nothing explains why the
mental elements that Easterbrook thinks justify protecting por-
nography do not also justify protecting rape and sexual murder (p
94). Likewise, if speech, such as pornography, is protected be-
cause it is a "representation," there is "no way to prohibit rape"
7 Here, Maclinnon's example of silencing is "the refusal of publishers and editors to
publish, or publish well, uncompromised expressions of dissent that make them uncom-
fortable by challenging the distribution of power, including sexual power" (p 77).
8 She continues: "[it does] the harm it does solely through the message it conveys" (p
33). MacKinnon does not seem to think that the method of causing harm is important. For
purposes of speech theory, she apparently would not distinguish crossburning from lynch-
ing (pp 33-35). I will later argue that the method of causing harm-social construction as
opposed to, for example, physical violence or use of force-is of crucial constitutional sig-
nificance. See text accompanying notes 57-59.
9 771 F2d 323, 329 (7th Cir 1985), aff'd 475 US 1001 (1986).
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because the rapist is watching the rape (pp 28-29). MacKinnon
similarly asks whether existing speech theory must protect lynch-
ing since lynching effectively expresses racism (pp 34-35). In
contrast to the initial coherence of the marketplace of ideas theo-
ry, free speech absolutism, as MacKinnon portrays it, has no
appeal. Regulation ought to be justifiable on the basis of what an
act does, its effects, the harm it causes-even though the act is
inevitably also expressive (pp 23, 91). Free speech absolutism is
absurd to the extent that it completely ignores this.
Having demolished what she portrays as the standard theo-
ries of free speech, equality enters Only Words as the improperly
ignored heroine that saves the day. But by equality MacKinnon
does not mean what she "affectionately" calls "the stupid theory
of equality" that, she says, dominates in the United States (p 98).
Under stupid equality, which "remain[s] rigidly neutral in ways
that either reinforce existing social inequality or prohibit chang-
ing it" (p 98), "inequality... is defined as distinction, as differen-
tiation, indifferent to whether dominant or subordinated groups
are hurt or helped" (p 98). Under this theory-also described as
"formal" (p 72), "negative" (p 72), or "neutral" (p 98), in addition
to "stupid" (p 98)-unconstitutional inequality is found by first
looking to see if men and women are being treated differently,
and then asking whether, at the appropriate intermediate level of
scrutiny, real differences adequately justify the difference in legal
treatment." At this point, equal-protection theorists diverge."
The currently dominant group, the sameness advocates, argues
that difference in legal treatment is almost never justified. Oth-
ers, the difference advocates, argue that at various points differ-
ent ("special") treatment should be permitted, despite the equali-
ty principle, because in some respects women are in fact different
(apparently meaning, different from the male norm). Although
she does not focus on them here, MacKinnon has trenchantly
criticized both approaches elsewhere. 2 She rightly attacks these
1 Although the neutrality theory of equality that MacKinnon attacks can be read off
the surface of many Supreme Court decisions, a closer reading shows, I think, that it has
virtually no purchase. For a discussion of this proposition, see C. Edwin Baker, Neutral-
ity, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection, 58 Tex L Rev
1029, 1070-94 (1980).
" MacKinnon cites Wendy Williams, Herma Kay, Fran Olsen, Sylvia Law, Stephanie
Wildman, and Nancy Dowd as theorists debating the merits of the sameness or difference
branches of standard equal-protection theory. MacKinnon, Feminist Theory of the State at
316 n 16 (cited in note 4).
12 MacKinnon began this critique of one conception of equality and her defense of an
alternative in her pathbreaking work on sexual harassment and has continued it since.
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formal analyses of difference both for their tendency to reify the
status quo, with its corresponding inequality, and for their fail-
ure to relate equal protection to what it is presumably about:
equality, which is surely a substantive concern with subordina-
tion and domination."
II. AN ALTERNATIVE
MacKinnon's alternative to this formal view of equality is a
substantive conception that treats material inequality, subordina-
tion, and domination as evils and any practice that contributes to
them as an offense to equality. "The main question [is]: does a
practice participate in the subordination of women to men, or is
it no part of it?" 4 This outcome-equality theory focuses firmly on
effects. As she puts it in Only Words, "the nature of the practice
can be understood and its impact measured from the damage it
causes ... " (p 100). This approach has obvious appeal to anyone
concerned with actual conditions in society, with the fairness of
the distribution of opportunities. Unsurprisingly, at least putting
aside the extensive sameness/difference debate among some legal
feminists, outcome-equality theories dominate leftist constitu-
tional scholarship. And from this perspective, one must ask about
pornography: does it contribute to the subordination of women?
MacKinnon's answer is unequivocal.
Only Words also purports to offer a "new model for freedom
of expression" (p 109). Piecing together the content of this new
model requires some effort. As noted, MacKinnon first emphasiz-
es the falsity of the premise of the classic marketplace of
ideas-that people reason to discover objective truth (pp 75-76).
Instead, speech acts; and people, especially people with power,
use speech to construct realities (pp 77-78). From here, anyone
sensitive to notions of equality might, like MacKinnon, make two
moves."' First, to correct for the failed premises of the market-
place of ideas, a proper realm of expression must not disadvan-
tage anyone from having expressive opportunities to create oper-
ative realities. 6 With this correction, "the free speech position
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (Yale, 1979);
MacKinnon, Feminist Theory of the State at 215-249 (cited in note 4); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 32-45 (Harvard, 1987).
13 MacKinnon, Feminist Theory of the State at 242.
14 Id at 248.
" MacKinnon recommends seeing speech "through an equality lens" (p 85).
16 Although she disavows the marketplace of ideas rubric (pp 75, 102), Mac~innon
still suggests that free speech is about thoughts and making arguments (p 62-63), only
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no longer supports social dominance, as it does now... " (p 109).
Rather, in this model "[tihe state will have [a great] role in pro-
viding relief from injury to equality through speech and in giving
equal access to speech... " (p 109). Free speech may require the
occasional silencing of otherwise dominant speakers in order to
"make more space for the unequal to find voice" (p 103).
The second move involves reconsideration of the dangers
involved in prohibiting allegedly false ideas. The classic theory,
while only valuing speech instrumentally, does not permit pro-
hibiting "false ideas" for fear that the censor might make mis-
takes. The Supreme Court summed up this principle in the claim
that from the perspective of free speech, "there is no such thing
as a false idea." 7 Or more to the point, people's reason is to be
more trusted than the censor's hand, for in the realm of the
mind, truths will eventually chase out bad or evil ideas.
As MacKinnon recognizes, this confidence in reason is not
warranted if people create truth through their expression. "Bad
ideas" can become part of the reality-and more so the more
"speech" resources are used to create and maintain them. In
contrast, a constitutional commitment to fundamental values,
equality in particular, provides a constitutional reason not to
allow the creation of certain truths or the advancement of certain
ideas. If speech creates reality and the Constitution commits us
to certain values, then there is no instrumental basis to protect
speech that contradicts these values. Thus, MacKinnon logically
asserts that because the country "is supposedly not constitution-
ally neutral on the subject [of equality]" (p 86), the Supreme
Court was wrong to treat the Klan's speech in Brandenburg v
Ohio8 with the same tolerance it extended to the civil rights
leaders' speech in NAACP v Claiborne Hardware (p 86)."9
Speech proposing or furthering inequality has no value in this
more circumspect, instrumentally constrained marketplace of
ideas, because as to "the idea of human equality," the law,
specifically the "legal guarantee of equality," has already decided
that it is "true" (p 107).
This market-failure speech theory ° shares a striking fea-
she wants to assure that the speech is "free and equal" (p 77), that the subordinated are
able "to find voice" (p 103).
17 Gertz v Robert Welch, 418 US 323, 339 (1974).
" 395 US 444 (1969) (per curiam).
'9 458 US 886 (1982). MacKinnon also adopts this logic in arguing that "whether or
not forced sex is a good idea ... is not supposed to be debatable to the same degree as is
the organization of the economy" (p 39).
' The reference here is not to failed economic markets (although they often do fail in
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ture with outcome-equality theories. As MacKinnon properly
emphasizes, in both theories the legitimacy of any practice de-
pends on its effects. The speech theory's concern is with the
practice's effect on the distribution of expressive opportunities.
But since many important practices inevitably have some, even if
minor, negative effects on some constitutional interest, not every
such practice should automatically be outlawed. The necessary
result is balancing. The point hardly merits serious argu-
ment-MacKinnon need only note in an aside that the Constitu-
tion is "a document that accepts balancing among constitutional
interests as method" (p 84). Thus, the proper constitutional test
is to determine "if the harm of speech outweighs its value" (p 91).
In any event, the necessity of constitutional balancing is logically
mandated given that a legal provision can serve one constitu-
tional value while having a negative impact from the perspective
of another constitutional value. Inevitably, one will sometimes
find "equality supporting a statute or practice, speech challenging
it" (p 85).
III. APPLICATION OF THEORY TO PORNOGRAPHY
Both MacKinnon's outcome-equality theory and her market-
failure speech theory have considerable scholarly creden-
tials-they represent the most popular "progressive" alternative
to what MacKinnon asserts are the leading mainstream doctrines
of equality and free speech. Given her empirical premises about
the harm caused by pornography, MacKinnon can use this pro-
gressive constitutional perspective to identify four reasons for
upholding a ban.
First is an argument internal to the goal of guaranteeing free
speech. Any legal regime or social practice that impedes speech is
constitutionally objectionable-even more so if it impedes the
speech of the comparatively powerless. According to MacKinnon,
"pornography and its protection have deprived women of speech,
especially speech against sexual abuse" (p 9).21 Although some
the expression context). Rather, I propose an analogy. Just as the premises of free market'
economics often are not met in actual economic markets, leading to market failures,
likewise the premises of the classic marketplace of ideas theory are not met, leading to a
failure of that theory. The approach to free speech that results from introducing appropri-
ate correctives for those failed premises is the "market-failure speech theory."
21 Or, again: "pornography [in] reality is what silenced women have not been permit-
ted to say for hundreds of years" (pp 40-41). For purposes of this Review, I put aside the
lack of evidence for the claim that pornography has been a major mechanism for the
historical silencing of women.
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readers will take this claim to be metaphorical, MacKinnon ar-
gues that this simply reflects their failure to see that speech
acts-that speech does things, often including crimes (pp 11-13).
As long as- pornographers' speech silences women's speech, there
is an internal conflict, because whatever is done suppresses some
speech. However, the reformulated speech theory provides direc-
tion. The goal of equalizing speech opportunities necessarily calls
for suppressing the pornographers', not women's, speech.
Second, even if it does not completely silence women, pornog-
raphy constitutes powerful expression by the privileged. And "the
more the speech of the dominant is protected, the more dominant
they become and the less the subordinated are heard from... "
(pp 72-73). An appropriate speech arena would correct the imbal-
ance. Legal limits on pornography move toward equalization by
limiting the powerful and by making "more space for the unequal
to find voice" (p 103)Y The limits provide a better basis for con-
fidence, not in finding truth, but in constructing the social reality
fairly.
Third, recognition that speech is often action raises the pos-
sibility that pornography is not the type of conduct with which
the free speech principle is concerned. Free speech is about argu-
ment, about something that "works through thought" (p 62). But
"[uin pornography, pictures and words are sex' (p 26). "Pornogra-
phy is masturbation material" (p 17)." MacKinnon argues that
"having sex is antithetical to thinking" (p 17). "[The way [por-
nography] works is not as a thought or through its ideas as such,
at least not in the way thoughts and ideas are protected as
speech" (p 21). "So-called speech that works as a sex act is not an
' This argument, of course, is the market-failure speech theory. The Supreme Court
has consistently rejected it, most prominently in Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1 (1976) (per
curiam). Although some read Austin v Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652
(1990), as reviving this theory, the better reading understands Austin merely to treat
corporate political speech as subject to regulation in ways and for reasons that do not
apply to individual speech.
Although this is certainly one use of pornography, even the most "hard core"
material has numerous uses. For example, many report using such material to learn
about possible sexual variations, which is hardly surprising in a country as committed to
sex education as ours. See, for example, Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce Appellate
Brief Amici Curiae in American Booksellers Ass'n v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985)
(Dkt No 84-3147, filed Apr 8, 1985), reprinted in Nan D. Hunter and Sylvia A. Law, Brief
Amic Curiae of Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et al, 21 U Mich J L Ref 69, 120 (1988) ("De-
pictions of ways of living and acting that are radically different from our own can enlarge
the range of human possibilities open to us and help us grasp the potentialities of human
behavior, both good and bad.").
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argument .... Compared with a thought, it raises far less diffi-
cult speech issues, if it raises any at all" (p 63).24
This critique roughly duplicates Justice Brennan's conclusion
that "obscenity is not within the areas of constitutionally protect-
ed speech or press."' Obscenity is excluded not because it in-
volves bad ideas, since "unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion... have
the full protection of the guaranties," 2 but because it contains
no ideas, which is why it is "utterly without redeeming social
importance"27  from the perspective of the marketplace of
ideasY
Implicitly, then, Brennan accepted a variation of the thesis
that obscenity is just masturbation material. But given the com-
mitment to absolute protection for all ideas, with their valuation
left to the marketplace of ideas, Brennan properly charged that
the more balancing-oriented Burger Court's test of whether a
work lacked "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value"
amounted to "nothing less than a rejection of the fundamental
First Amendment premises and rationale of the Roth opin-
W~9ion ....
But see C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Protection for Gays, NY Times A23
(July 27, 1991) (noting many people experience sexual behavior as one of their most
important and most self-defining forms of communication, which suggests that Bowers v
Hardwick, 478 US 186 (1986), was wrong not to protect consensual sodomy as expression).
' Roth v United States, 354 US 476, 485 (1957).
2 Id at 484.
27 Id.
' It is clear that Brennan is here defining "social importance" as value within the
marketplace of ideas (that is, does it contain ideas) and not within the economic market
and hence is relying on a marketplace of ideas theory of the First Amendment, in that
otherwise he would have no answer to Justice Douglas's challenge that obscene materials
obviously have value to the people who purchase them and, therefore, do not lack social
value. See Ginzberg v United States, 383 US 463, 489-91 (1966) (Douglas dissenting).
2 Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 413 US 49, 97 (1973) (Brennan dissenting). Be-
tween Roth and Paris Adult Theatre, Brennan changed from focusing on the marketplace
of ideas rationale to giving primacy to the notion of individual liberty or autonomy. Thus,
in Paris Adult Theatre, Brennan's Roth approach may have been too restrictive. He
argued that the "right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social
worth.., is fundamental to our free society" and "is closely tied.., to 'the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwarranted governmental intrusions
into one's privacy'" and to "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id at 85-86 n 9 (internal citations omitted).
Adopting the typical liberty emphasis on "consenting adults," Brennan also suggested that
it may "follow that a State could not constitutionally punish one who undertakes to
provide this information to a willing, adult recipient." Id at 86 n 9.
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MacKinnon's approach differs from Brennan's in that
MacKinnon explicitly would permit the banning, as pornography,
of material that incontrovertibly contains value in the market-
place of ideas. This broad coverage is even more constitutionally
troublesome than the fact that MacKinnon would identify the
prohibited material on the basis of its content.0
Even if right, this critique is not completely fair to
MacKinnon's argument. After persuasively arguing that speech
can be a form of action and also arguing (less persuasively) that
the harm of pornography is not in its ideas but in what it does,
MacKinnon asserts that regulation is based on what pornography
does, not on what it says (p 23). Her claim is that regulating
pornography is similar to regulating words like "sleep with me
and I'll give you an A," or "fuck me or you're fired" (pp 13-14).
These words, in context, are exercises of power; they do some-
thing. Likewise, pornography involves the exercise of power and
does things: it constructs an oppressive social world, it subordi-
nates women, it is sex. Thus, if pornography is also regulated on
the basis of what it does-construct an oppressive social
world-then United States v O'Brien31 arguably provides the
appropriate constitutional test. Pornography and draft-card burn-
ing both involve expression, but both are assertedly regulable on
the basis of what the "speaker" does." Regulation of pornogra-
phy should be upheld because it "furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest; ... the governmental interest is
unrelated to suppression of free expression;" and, arguably, "the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."33
Thus, MacKinnon concludes that pornography presents an easy
case in that the concern is not with bad ideas, but with bad acts
(pp 56, 62-63). Unlike the harassment that works its harm
through its content, for example most racial harassment, pornog-
raphy is harassment that works its harm through what it
does-sex (pp 62-63)."4
' Compare Hudnut, 771 F2d at 327-31. But see R.A.V. v St. Paul, 112 S Ct 2538,
2545-46 (1992) (content distinctions even within the category of unprotected speech can be
unconstitutional).
3' 391 US 367 (1.968).
Obviously, the Court's conclusion that the government regulates draft-card burning
on the basis of the behavior and not the expression, id at 381, 385-86, is subject to serious
criticism, but given that conclusion, the Court's analysis seems doctrinally appropriate.
33 Id at 377.
' See Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 628 (1984) (denying the Jaycees'
claimed right to exclude women and arguing that, "like violence or other types of poten-
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MacKinnon's fourth reason for upholding a ban on pornogra-
phy is that even if pornography is expression within the market-
place of ideas, its value is low and the reasons for prohibiting it
are great. The balance thus favors suppression. Of course, this
point would be hard to sustain within the classic marketplace
theory. In that account, the value of different ideas is not a mat-
ter for the government or the court to consider. Instead, low-
value ideas are expected to be chased out by better speech. How-
ever, once we reject the classic theory as based on insupportable
premises, we shall see that some ideas, especially ideas of the
powerful that contradict basic constitutional norms such as
equality, are less valuable within a speech arena where people
construct truths. An appropriate balance would recognize the
importance of equality and deny protection to harassment, such
as racial harassment, that is speech in that it is behavior that
"works [its harm] through its content" (p 56), or perhaps even
deny protection to mere racial disparagement. Thus, even if
MacKinnon's claim that pornography is action (sex) were reject-
ed, this balance pro'ides an adequate reason to restrict pornogra-
phy (p 108; see also pp 86-87, 99-100).
IV. CRITIQUE
Many persuasive progressive and feminist critiques of
MacKinnon's proposals reject both her empirical account of por-
nography and her assessment of the process of social and polit-
ical change. As a matter of politics or culture, this direction of
critique merits center stage-but I have little to offer there that
has not been better said by others. However, a second critique,
sketched here, is to challenge MacKinnon's constitutional vision
and offer a better one-a vision in which the constitutional
norms of speech and equality do not conflict, and in which por-
nography merits protection.35
tially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact .... [this exclusion is] entitled to no constitutional protection").
' Any attempt to cite constitutional scholarship that supports either MacKinnon's
constitutional positions or the alternative that I outline here would require massive no-
tation of equal protection and free speech scholarship as well as much of the literature on
constitutional interpretation. Still, I should note that I previously developed the specific
critique and the alternative offered here in C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom
of Speech (Oxford, 1989); Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of
Equal Protection, 58 Tex L Rev 1029 (1980); Outcome Equality or Equality of Respect: The
Substantive Content of Equal Protection, 131 U Pa L Rev 933 (1983); Sandel on Rawls,
133 U Pa L Rev 895 (1985).
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A substantive theory of constitutional equality might envi-
sion a particular just society and either mandate that the legal
order achieve that result or, at least, balance the value provided
by any deviation against its effect on equality. This view of
equality rejects "politics" in the sense of popular discussion and
democratic decision making about how to construct society and
replaces them with a blueprint and a calculus of consequences.
Under this outcome approach, effects analyses are central.
However, a substantive theory of equality that rejects mere
neutrality and formalism is not necessarily a pure outcome theo-
ry. Constitutional equality could more narrowly mean that cer-
tain particular substantive goals, certain value judgments, are
impermissible ends or premises for exercises of collective authori-
ty. Subordination and stigmatization are ruled out as goals; laws
that imply inequality of worth are impermissible. Constitutional
equality prohibits any government decision to advance these
impermissible goals or to exhibit this impermissible premise. The
theme is not so much bad effects (effects inconsistent with consti-
tutionally mandated outcomes) but bad objectives. Under this ap-
proach, inegalitarian effects of a practice do not create an auto-
matic conflict with equal protection.
Collective self-determination requires a polity capable of
choosing to promote one or another conception of the good-and
different choices will comparatively advantage some and disad-
vantage others. But the resulting legal order must be able to
justifiably ask people to accept the obligation of law. It is difficult
to explain how a person can be asked to accept disadvantage
unless, at a minimum, the collective order treats her as an au-
tonomous agent and respects her as an equal of other such
agents. Surely any law or governmental practice that denies a
person's inherent worth cannot justify legal obligation.36 In con-
trast, political self-determination requires the opportunity to
choose collective projects that have unequal effects. These choices
should not be understood as governmental denials of people's
equality as long as the project's rationale is not properly under-
stood as subordinating or denigrating other people.37 Of course,
' Private individuals may, in their expression, deny others' worth and, in their use of
their resources, purposely exacerbate inequality. Such a use of autonomy is properly criti-
cized. Still, the justification of the legal order does not require "good" purposes on their
part but does require collective respect for their autonomy, respect consistent with persua-
sion or education but not suppression.
'3 But see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan L Rev 317 (1987) (showing that a purpose to subordi-
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unless some basic principle (like a free-speech guarantee) re-
quires permitting practices that contribute to inequality, a legis-
lative concern with equality could support a prohibition of such
practices. Thus, legislation can properly outlaw certain
inegalitarian "effects" even though these effects do not offend
constitutional equality. 8
Under this account, constitutional equality does not conflict
with free speech or constitutional liberty. Private speech can
deny others' equality, can stigmatize, and can promote further
inequality, but private speech is on a different plane from govern-
mental practices. Private speech cannot conflict with the
government's obligation to respect equality." The private speak-
er does not need to be able to assert to another that she should
obey the law. The legitimacy of the legal order does not depend
on a private speaker behaving in a manner that would enable
her to assert that she shows respect for others' equality or au-
tonomy. In contrast, although the legislature can choose to pro-
mote extremely egalitarian outcomes, as with any other legisla-
tive policy it must use means consistent with people's fundamen-
tal rights, that is, consistent with respect for the regulated
person's autonomy and, hence, consistent with her expressive
freedom.
Since this interpretation of constitutional equality apparently
demands less in the way of material equality than do outcome-
equality theories, its appeal may be questionable, at least for
nate or denigrate does not necessarily have to be conscious).
3 Thus, equality of respect distinguishes equality as a right from legislative egalitar-
ian goals. In contrast, most outcome-equality theories ignore the difference between
constitutional and legislative equality except for suggesting that sometimes institutional
competence should limit the constitutional implementation of equality.
' A different interpretation of equality of respect, which cannot be ruled out without
considerable argument, might assert that a state does not respect people unless it affirm-
atively prohibits private expressive behavior premised on the denial of respect. Neverthe-
less, as compared to the necessity of providing people with those goods or opportunities
considered necessary for a full life in a community, which merely requires particular allo-
cation policies, a person who fears being among the "worst off' is likely to place a much
lower priority on concerns that require restricting others' liberty. Moreover, such limita-
tions are potentially much more costly in that they may require people to give up their
own autonomy and renounce living in a community where people are free to adopt and
express their own commitments. Finally, this liberty-limiting interpretation of equality of
respect is in some tension with the premises that require collective recognition of the
equality right. Specifically, the premises are that those claiming the legitimacy of legal
obligation must be able to justify their claim in addressing the autonomous agents who
are assertedly obligated; and that the necessity of making this address assumes, and the
content of the justification requires, that those addressed must be respected both as
equals and as autonomous agents.
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people on the left or for "victims" of inequality. Without attempt-
ing a complete comparative assessment, I will list several points
that arguably allay this concern. First, contrary to initial appear-
ances, equality of respect has considerable substance and may
accomplish roughly as much in the way of egalitarian results as
the outcome-equality approach. The legal order has been riddled
with provisions that subordinate or stigmatize people on the
basis of who they are rather than what they do. The existing
legal order also fails to provide everyone with those opportunities
and resources that society regards as essential to full participa-
tion in the community. Equality of respect requires correction of
these violations. An outcome-equality balancing analysis-as
carried out by any but the most extreme egalitarians (who are
not likely to populate the judiciary)-is unlikely to lead to many
additional egalitarian interventions.
Second, identifying government actions that have an invidi-
ous purpose is a more appropriate judicial task than evaluating
the policy importance of present and predicted effects. The appro-
priateness follows initially in that a court must always have
some understanding of the meaning or purpose of a law in order
to apply it, but generally the court does not hold hearings to
enable it to second guess the legislature about the law's conse-
quences, nor does it normally evaluate the merit of those conse-
quences. Still, in non-constitutional contexts, policy-based inter-
action of courts and legislatures, as well as value-based interpre-
tative presumptions (such as egalitarian or libertarian presump-
tions about legislative goals), may be appropriate. Thus, the
claim here concerning appropriateness is best understood to be
premised on constitutional theory. Within typical versions of
liberal theory, the best justification of democratic decision mak-
ing is that it is required as an embodiment of respect for people's
equality, autonomy, and dignity. This rationale, however, also
imposes limits on democracy-it does not authorize collective
exercises of power that contradict or reject the values that justi-
fied the power in the first place. If legislative bodies are preemi-
nently involved in democratic policy making, possibly because
they are supposedly the institution most open to popular pres-
sure or dialogue and hence democratic choice, then courts might
be assigned a different role. When acting in their constitutional
capacity, courts would assure that the legislative body is not
going beyond its realm of authorized authority. With respect to
constitutional equality, courts would police for laws that deny
people's equality of worth. Of course, this task will still require
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difficult judgments made more difficult because social groups will
contest social meanings of laws or governmental practices.
Third, unlike a general mandate to always achieve egalitari-
an results, prohibiting government officials from acting for vari-
ous bad reasons, while affirming their responsibility to make
choices concerning affirmative visions of society, recognizes an
appropriate role for popular self-determination. In a sense, this
interpretation of equal protection requires purifying, but not
otherwise restraining, democratic politics. Even the worst-off
could value this political openness more than the outcomes em-
bodied in an abstractly formulated level of equality: if, for exam-
ple, political choices lead to a culture or to forms of solidarity
that the poor value higher than slightly more egalitarian materi-
al outcomes. In the end, however, the comparative appeal of
these two substantive theories of equality should turn largely on
the persuasiveness of the moral/political justification offered for
each.4"
Rejecting MacKinnon's view of constitutional equality is a
necessary first step, because that view makes a conflict between
equality and existing constitutional notions of speech (or liberty)
inevitable. Independent of that conflict, her market-failure theory
of free speech justifies censoring pornography. This market-fail-
ure theory, while reading free speech through an equality lens,
continues to view the function of protected speech much like the
classic marketplace of ideas. Although its egalitarian content
makes it attractive as a basis for legislative interventions that
are consistent with free-speech constraints, it lacks appeal as a
constitutional mandate. Civil libertarians will properly worry
40 It also may be significant that equality of respect has much deeper roots in existing
equal protection precedent. Likewise, in two important areas where existing law diverges
from the requirements of both equality of respect and outcome equality, equality of re-
spect offers just as clear but possibly more broadly or easily acceptable arguments for the
constitutional claim. Claims for socially-recognized necessities, such as food, education,
and shelter, constitute one of these areas. Additionally, equality of respect recognizes the
clear legitimacy of politically-chosen affirmative-action programs, as Justices Brennan and
Marshall have eloquently argued ever since Brennan's explanation that "[glovernment
may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial groups,"
although "reality rebukes us that race has too often been used by those who would stig-
matize and oppress minorities." Regents of University of California v Bakke, 438 US 265,
325, 327 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). "[Tihe cardinal principle [is] that racial classifications that
stigmatize... are invalid without more." Id at 357-58. In Macinnon's terms, these
Justices are not concerned with difference but with subordination. They are concerned
with purposeful subordination and stigmatizing meanings, rather than subordinating
effects.
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because this market failure theory legitimizes the suppression of
some people's speech as the means to equalize speech opportuni-
ties. The fact that no standards identify the properly equalized or
fair speech environment only intensifies this skepticism. The lack
of an adequately specified constitutional mandate permits the
theory to be easily manipulated to justify censorship of whatever
views the majority decides should be suppressed.
Nevertheless, the greatest inadequacy of the market-failure
theory is that it fails to recognize or provide for the primary
value of or justification for protecting expression. Freedom of
speech may be a fundamental right because respect for people's
autonomy requires that people be free to engage in certain types
of actions, to make certain choices. Speech may be paradigmatic
of this type of action. Unlike marketplace theories, either the
classic version or MacKinnon's reformulated egalitarian version,
under this approach the typical ways in which speech is also
action do not justify regulation. On this view, freedom of speech
is fundamental less because of its instrumental value or the
value of reasoned arguments (p 63) and more because freedom to
engage in self-expressive acts is central to individual liberty.
Moreover, this approach recognizes that for many people, partici-
pation in the process of political and social change, which is en-
compassed in the protected liberty, will more likely, and more
democratically,4' take the form of social construction42 through
expressive behavior than through traditional arguments about
ideas.
Some elements of existing constitutional doctrine are most
easily seen in this light. The right to refuse to salute the flag'4
or display a state motto on a license plate4 is clearly more
about individual liberty than about the marketplace of ideas,
either in the classic or modified form. Likewise, music is presum-
41 "More democratically" in that each person's choice about expressive behavior con-
tributes to the net result of creating the culture, creating the social constructions, in
which they live. In contrast, decision by majority vote leaves the losers' vote not (directly)
embodied in the outcome. Arguably, voting is the most democratic procedure only for deci-
sions that can only be effectively made in terms of a yes or no position for the group, that
is, for issues appropriately settled by lawmaking.
42 "[S]o-called speech ... constructs the social reality in which people live" (pp 30-31).
Presumably, Maclinnon calls it "so-called" speech when the speech is not argument but
an activity, or, as she puts it in the deleted portion of the quoted passage, because it is
.an exercise of power" (p 31). In contrast, the liberty theory accepts it as "speech" since
the theory assumes that people should have the right to exercise some forms of power.
41 West Virginia State Board of Education v Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943).
44 Wooley v Maynard, 430 US 705 (1977).
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ably protected as free speech even if listened to more for enjoy-
ment or for dancing than for ideas. First Amendment rights to
write a diary, prepare lists, associate with people, or boycott"
are better described as aides to memories, carrying out projects,
or as aspects of creating identity, not as debate about ideas. Both
comparatively passive television viewers and activists who have
sought to induce television programmers to include more and
more accurate and positive images of older people, racial and
ethnic minorities, and gay men and lesbians46 are better seen as
exercising their freedom to engage in the politics of cultural con-
struction than in the rational debate of ideas. It is in this sense
that individual liberty encompasses receipt of pornography. Even
expression that is received less as argument than as "masturba-
tion material" (p 17), becomes part of a cultural or behavioral
"debate" about sexuality, about the nature of human relations,
and about pleasure and morality, as well as about the roles of
men and women. Historically, puritanical attempts to suppress
sexually explicit materials appear largely designed to shut down
this cultural contestation in favor of a traditional practice of
keeping women in the private sphere.4 Opening up this cultural
debate has in the past, and can in the future, contribute to pro-
gressive change.
This liberty interpretation of the free-speech guarantee runs
smack into the assertions on which MacKinnon bases her scorn
of free-speech absolutism. By MacKinnon's lights, the view I am
defending is nothing more than the claim that "whatever is ex-
pressive should be constitutionally protected" (p 89). But, she and
other critics quickly point out, unquestionably expressive behav-
ior is often clearly not protected as speech. 8 For example, read-
45 See NAACP v Clairborne Hardware, 458 US 886 (1982).
41 See Kathryn C. Montgomery, Target: Prime Time-Advocacy Groups and the
Struggle over Entertainment Television (Oxford, 1989). Montgomery's account identifies
differences in the political practices successful at broadening versus those successful at
narrowing the range of representations presented by the media. See C. Edwin Baker,
Advertising and a Democratic Press 61-62 (Princeton, 1994). High profile campaigns at-
tacking violence on television often obscure the multiplicity of the forms and contexts in
which violence is "represented" in culture and the ways those representations are rejected
or received and "decoded" by readers and viewers. Useful change in the media presenta-
tion of violence is not likely to result from ineffectual attempts at legal censorship of its
production and presentation. Rather, here too society needs an invigorated cultural
politics as well as some institutional means to free this cultural debate from the distor-
tions of the economic marketplace.
"' See Strossen, 79 Va L Rev at 1149-51 (cited in note 5).
4' See Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 787 & n 17, 828 n 18 (Founda-
tion, 2d ed 1988) (noting the popularity of this argument as well as outlining the response
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ing Hudnut to protect pornography because pornography contains
mental elements, MacKinnon argues that nothing explains why
the opinion does not require protection of "rape and sexual mur-
der, which have mental elements ... as well" (p 94; see also p
29). And after observing that lynching Black men has been very
effective at expressing racial hatred, MacKinnon asserts that
existing speech theory does not explain why these activities are
not expressive and, therefore, protected (pp 34-35). Of course, she
would deny protection on the basis of the harm that the expres-
sion does (p 91), and she elaborately describes the harm she
attributes to pornography (see, for example, pp 3-5). She argues,
however, that harm does not matter under existing speech doc-
trine, at least as offered by Judge Easterbrook's analysis in
Hudnut (p 93). From this she concludes that Easterbrook and the
absolutist branch of existing doctrine cannot constitutionally
distinguish benign expression from harmful expression (p 94).
This claim that speech theory cannot distinguish rape or
murder from protected speech is just wrong. Moreover, tradition-
al theory is right not to base the distinction on harm. Govern-
ment seldom regulates speech except where advocates of regula-
tion have a quite plausible argument that the speech causes or
constitutes harm. If speech is to receive protection as a funda-
mental right, the premise must be that some ways of causing
harm-especially the characteristic way that speech causes
harm-do not justify limiting liberty.49 This was Easterbrook's
point and the place where "mental intermediation" appeared in
the Hudnut opinion.0 Harm caused only through "mental inter-
mediation," that is, through the content of the communicated ex-
pression, should not be made illegal unless the harm-causing
speech is shown not to be an exercise of the liberty that justifies
speech protection. The autonomous act of the speaker does not
itself cause the harm. Rather, the harm occurs through how the
other person, presumably an autonomous agent whom we nor-
mally treat as bearing the responsibility for her own acts, re-
sponds. In contrast, a person who is raped or lynched is hurt
independent of the expression and is likely to object even if the
actor was not engaged in expression."
to it offered here).
"' I realize this claim is somewhat sweeping and requires a more extensive defense. A
critic might argue that there is no principled reason to protect any behavior that causes
harm but still argue for a rule protecting (some) speech because of a fear that government
officials systematically over-weigh the harm or under-weigh the benefits of speech.
771 F2d at 329.
51 But see Wisconsin v Mitchell, 113 S Ct 2194 (1993) (holding the expression of racial
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This liberty theory of speech has, however, more work to do.
Sometimes speech is criminal even though the speaker's offense
occurs only by means of "mental intermediation." A person com-
mits murder by telling her gun-toting partner to "shoot" or, while
knowing the cup contains a deadly poison, telling a companion to
"drink, it's a great thirst quencher." Speech can be the basis of
bribery, fraud, peijury, price fixing (p 12), or of on-the-job harass-
ment (see pp 45-50). Each example merits separate treatment,
although a key characteristic of each example is the speaker's
intentional use of instrumental power over another person. Some
examples involve joint participation in an act that is criminal
independent of its expressive content (murder). Other examples
involve the abuse of institutionally created power. Since a
speaker's liberty does not encompass any right for this institu-
tional power to exist, or for it to take any particular form, the
limited rationales for creating the power can justify restricting it
to use for its intended purposes or preventing it from being used
oppressively (price fixing, bribery, job harassment).52 Finally,
other cases are even more complex. An under-analyzed area of
First Amendment theory is why so many examples of unprotected
speech involve intentional falsehoods (fraud, perjury, under some
circumstances false cries of fire, defamation under a strict version
of the New York Times test).53 Usually the speaker intends the
listener to respond in ways that the speaker desires but that the
speaker expects the listener would resist if the listener had accu-
rate information. In this respect these outlawed uses of speech
involve instrumental behavior purposefully aimed at undermin-
ing the listener's autonomy. This quality distinguishes these
"lies" from protected speech.
Any argument that pornography fits into one of these or
some analogous category should fail. If pornography fits, any
harmful expression, that is, any expression that a government
might want to regulate, will fit.54 Unlike the above examples,
the alleged harm of pornography does not reflect use of any spe-
hatred-selecting a victim on the basis of race-is a punishable, additional evil when
there is an independent underlying offense).
' This instrumental/institutional analysis is also the basis for Justice Rehnquist's ar-
guments to deny constitutional protection to corporate political speech. First National
Bank v Bellotti, 435 US 765, 822 (1978) (Rehnquist dissenting). See generally C. Edwin
Baker, Property and its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U Pa L Rev 741
(1986).
New York Times v Sullivan, 376 US 254 (1964).
Admittedly, here these claims are merely assertions. Argument requires detail
beyond the scope of this Review.
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cial, institutionally based power." Even if pornography can be
said to be in some sense a "lie," the lie is ideological, a fiction or
fantasy that may attempt to construct a particular social or-
der-not the "trick" involved in fraud or peijury.56 And even if
pornography leads to criminal behavior, crediting the listeners
(readers or viewers) as autonomous agents requires treating the
harm as reflecting their independent action.
V. DENYING PROTECTION REEXAMINED
If respect for liberty provides the rationale for protecting
speech, each of MacKinnon's four arguments for denying protec-
tion fail. First, within both conversation and decision making, the
speech (as well as the mere presence) of the powerful often effec-
tively silences many members of subordinate groups. They speak
less, speak more tentatively, and are heard less when they do
speak. Pornography, by affecting both men's image of women and
women's self-image, might be "action"-cultural construction, not
argument-that contributes to this silencing. But in a liberty
theory, this effect does not justify its suppression. Despite
Macinnon's more sweeping claims, this silencing, like all
silencings that constantly occur within the family, society, and
polity, is never total. Historically, women have spoken, and they
have been heard, even if less often and with more distortion and
against greater resistance than is fair. Overcoming silencing
should be a political/cultural project undertaken by all silenced
groups. However, at least within a legal order that respects both
equality and liberty as fundamental, support for this project
should take the form of empowerment, not the legal suppression
of others.
Additionally, the liberty theory's central premise is that free
speech protects certain means of action but not others. The ques-
5 Even on MacKinnon's account, the harm pornography causes involves, at the
collective level, cultural constructions and, at the individual level, specific responses
ranging from oppressive constructions of women's identity to specific acts of violence
against women; but both the collective and the individual responses to pornography are
independent of any special legal or institutional grants of power, and some, such as the
violence, are contrary to the often ineffectual institutionalized legal order.
'5 Implicitly asserting that we are told a lie, MacKinnon reports that "[wie are told
unendingly that the women in pornography are really enjoying themselves" (p 27). Al-
though I am not someone who has been "unendingly" told this, I expect, even if so told,
most consumers of pornography assume that the models have been paid (or, worse, have
been criminally coerced into being pictured), are acting, and although a few might enjoy
the work, are mostly either unhappy or at best unconcerned with it. As with most work,
they are willing to do it for the pay.
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tion is by what means does the action achieve its ends: through
the imposition of force or coercion or, alternatively, boycotts,
associations, persuasion, or social constructions that others can
reject or accept. How silencing occurs is crucial. The rapist silenc-
es by saying: "Don't yell or I'll use my knife," or 'Don't tell or I
will kill you and your sister." This is not, despite possible con-
trary claims by MacKinnon (p 21), what pornography says. It
does not require specific behavior (silence) on the basis of the
speaker's realistic, direct threat to violate the law. Pornography
silences, to the extent it does, as part of a broad form of social
construction. And because pornography is both semiotically more
open and not backed by the instrumental force involved in the
rapist's speech, the audience shares with the speaker both con-
trol over and responsibility for those constructions. "Unsilenced"
feminists are prominent among those who contest dominant con-
structions. Any silencing brought about by pornography does not
justify the legal suppression of pornography, because the silenc-
ing represents the way protected speech is supposed to work: by
involving people using expression to construct realities.
The complaint about pornography is like the conservatives'
complaint that "PC" orthodoxy silences the "good racist or sexist."
Both are complaints about people using expression to create
social realities that silence others. Of course, PC never complete-
ly silences racist or sexist expression (some would lament that it
does not even come close) any more than pornography ever com-
pletely silences women. But both should be seen as protected
uses of expression-although that obviously does not mean that
the two forms of silencing should be similarly valued. Any silenc-
ing resulting from pornography should be opposed by avoiding or
transforming the silencing pornographic expression and by reject-
ing the social constructions associated with the silencing. In con-
trast, unlike some critics of PC, I think that to the extent people
have used expression to construct a social reality that silences
sexist or racist views, they have used speech to create a better
world.
Second, MacKinnon's claim that suppressing pornography
helps equalize the communications environment runs afoul of
civil liberty's most fundamental premise, which is embodied in
the liberty theory or what MacKinnon calls speech absolutism:
Although important social goals are often most conveniently (and
sometimes only) advanced by torture, illegal searches, subordina-
tion or denigration of some group, or suppression of speech, a
good society may only advance its goals by means that respect
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people's dignity, equality, and liberty. Choosing governmental
regulatory means that purposefully violate these rights is imper-
missible.
Of course, collective choices will inevitably affect the distri-
bution of speech opportunities, as well as other resources avail-
able to oppressed racial, ethnic, religious, or gender groups. Un-
equal distributions are not per se violations of the disadvantaged
group's rights. A robust polity must allow for collective choices
that have such effects, as well as choices to equalize allocations.
But suppression of pornography operates not by reallocating
resources; rather it prohibits people's expressive use of the re-
sources they have. Shutting down differs fundamentally from
redistributing. The first denies the value of liberty while the
second recognizes the fact of scarcity. Society acts improperly
when it uses limitations on liberty as its means-just as it does if
it uses means that disrespect people's dignity or equality.
Third, although much (but maybe not all) of the material
covered by Macinnon's broad conception of pornography will
include ideas or argument, she claims that the reason for the
regulation is not to suppress pornography's argument but to
suppress pornography's action. This claim is obviously tailored to
refute marketplace-of-ideas rationales for protection and does not
work as a critique of the broader liberty or autonomy theory's
justification for protecting pornography unless the pornography
functions like a gun rather than a social construction. Despite
some rhetoric, MacKinnon states no reasons to view pornography
like the gun. Moreover, this failure is not entirely surprising
since her argument (possibly purposefully) never distinguishes
between types of actions;57 she only distinguishes argument and
action. When she says that "so-called speech can be an exercise of
power which constructs the social reality in which people live,
from objectification to genocide" (pp 30-31), she is, of course, right
that speech is action that constructs the social reality in which
genocide (and everything else) takes place. She is also right that
"' Of course, distinctions between types of action are irrelevant for a person who is
only concerned with effects, as is usually the case with MacKinnon. However, most
conceptions of social life do make these distinctions. For example, rape and consensual
(possibly female-initiated) intercourse both have the same effect of penetration, but for
most purposes people distinguish them as involving different ways of acting. But see
Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse 133 (Free Press, 1987) ("Physically, the woman in inter-
course is a space inhabited, a literal territory occupied literally: occupied even if there has
been no resistance, no force; even if the occupied person said yes please, yes hurry, yes
more.").
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different constructions make some actions more thinkable and
coherent and, thus, more open for adoption. She is wrong, howev-
er, if her claim is that speech constitutes genocide or rape.58
Part of the reason to protect speech, or, more broadly, to protect
liberty, is a commitment to the view that people should be able to
participate in constructing their world, or to the belief that this
popular participation provides the best way to move toward a
better world. 9 The guarantee of liberty represents a deep faith
in people and in democracy.
Fourth is the argument that justifies suppression because
pornography's value is low and its harm is great. Although these
points are clearly relevant for the balancing required by a mar-
ket-failure theory, suppression on this basis is inconsistent with
the civil liberties commitment to promote desirable practices and
prevent harms by means that do not themselves deny people's
dignity or abridge their liberty. Government suppression of ex-
' Her claim that pornography is violence is somewhat more plausible when she
discusses its production. She argues that women are "gang raped," "hurt and penetrated,
tied and gagged, undressed and genitally spread," and "killed... to make pornography"
(p 15). She states that these types of acts are "essential ... to make pornography" (p 15).
But given her broad definition of pornography, including pictures and words, these acts
cannot be essential; they are not needed in order to draw an illustration or write a story,
for example. (Often MacKinnon seems to keep "hard core" pictorials and videos in mind
when she describes the evil, although her definition is consciously much broader.) In any
event, any criminal acts committed in the process of production can and should be pun-
ished.
Macimnnon also provocatively suggests that accepting payment or not objecting
"does not make the sex consensual; it makes pornography an arm of prostitution" (p 28).
Although a liberty theory would surely allow truly consensual production of pornography
(self-made, non-commercial pornography, for example), it might accept that arguments
justifying state power to prohibit prostitution also apply to prohibiting paid sex acts for
purposes of producing pornography. But see Carlin Meyer, Decriminalizing Prostitution:
Liberation or Dehumanization?, I Cardozo Women's L J 105 (1993) (arguing that femi-
nists ought to oppose laws against prostitution). The claim that accepting money does not
constitute consent is troubling, however, because it apparently justifies state authority to
ban any form of "acting" for money, including, for example, in the movies or the theater.
This apparently follows if a reason for rejecting Lochner v New York, 148 US 45 (1905), is
that the use of money in market exchanges is a form of exercise of instrumental power
over another person that should routinely be subject to the government's authority to
regulate. Nevertheless, maybe the First Amendment's institutional protection of the press
means that acts that are permissible (intercourse, for example), if not done commercially,
cannot be made impermissible merely because paid for in the process of making media
communications. In any event, Macinnon's prostitution analogy is at most an argument
that the production of pornography may be r'egulated or restricted, not an argument
against pornography itself.
" "Free speech has been on balance an ally of those seeking change .... Change in
any complex system ultimately depends on the ability of outsiders to challenge accepted
views and the reigning institutions. Without a strong guarantee of freedom of speech,
there is no effective right to challenge what is." Hudnut, 771 F2d at 332.
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pressive options seems directly inconsistent with respect for
people's autonomy or dignity.
MacKinnon might reply that I cannot seriously believe that
the portrayal of women in pornography treats women as dignified
or that women participants really choose to be so portrayed; thus,
pornography is inconsistent with autonomy and dignity for wom-
en. The civil libertarians' failure to see this merely reflects their
adopting a male perspective in their discussion of autonomy and
dignity. The legal order really treats women with dignity only if
it gives them a civil right of action based on the harm pornogra-
phy does.
This response has force; however, it moves too quickly. First,
although moralists certainly argue that people ought to manifest
respect for others, the more foundational moral notion is that
these people are "agents" capable of and responsible for moral
choice. This implies that they might refuse to display this re-
spect. In contrast, the argument that the state must manifest
respect is not because it is a moral agent but rather because the
respect is a prerequisite of its functioning as a legitimate order
capable of justifying legal obligation. Thus, there is no basis for
recognizing a right of the state, in contrast to the individual, to
refuse to manifest respect. At least within liberal political theory,
it is only the state that has an unvarying legal obligation to re-
spect people's autonomy (or their dignity and equality)." Sec-
ond, put aside the comparatively rare case where a woman's
participation in the production of pornography is criminally co-
erced (which by definition should be outlawed and where the
woman should have a legal action against the pornographer). The
further claim that the women portrayed in the pornography lack
freedom and dignity and that this justifies suppression of the
activity in which they actually engage may be presumptuous. It
may ignore the rationality and dignity of women's responses to
the circumstances that exist.6' Suppression of opportunity for
that choice can easily make the participant worse off-doing
without food for one's children or oneself may be less dignified or
free than being portrayed in pornography. In contrast to suppres-
sion, government intervention to change resource allocations or
to increase and improve the options available are state actions
' This is the public/private distinction that liberal theory requires, even if it cannot
be fully maintained. Frank I. Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a
Contradictory World, Nomos 28: Justification 71-99 (NYU, 1986).
"' See Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis L Rev 539.
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fully consistent with respecting women's autonomy and dignity
and may be required as an aspect of respecting their equality. In
this respect, the use of minimum wage laws does not exhibit the
paternalism implicit in a ban on being portrayed in pornography.
Likewise, proper governmental interventions include cultural and
educational critiques of the anti-women ideologies that pornogra-
phy (as well as ubiquitous cultural artifacts ranging from adver-
tising to Walt Disney productions) helps maintain. Accepting the
characterizations of the harms caused by pornography, these at-
tempts at persuasion remain consistent with respect for people's
liberty.
Assuming acceptance of her underlying empirical claims,
each of MacKinnon's constitutional arguments has force. They
duplicate arguments that have been favorably viewed by some
constitutional scholars. However, given a better interpretation of
the First Amendment, they fail. That is, MacKinnon's arguments
do not work if the central premise of the First Amendment is
that in its pursuit of collective objectives, including egalitarian
policies, the government must not choose as its end or its means
the suppression of expressive options.62
CONCLUSION
Few readers will find here enough discussion of competing
First Amendment approaches to be convinced which is best. I will
conclude, however, by examining how MacKinnon's general
stance differs from that implicit in the liberty and equality-of-
respect theories.
That MacKinnon would not find the liberty theory of free
speech appealing should be no surprise. Her constitutional ap-
proach never affirms, and her descriptions of pornography implic-
itly deny, the existence or significance of human agency or auton-
omy. Her approach is much like the once fashionable theory of
the mass media that saw a public duped into accepting whatever
messages the mass media transmitted.63 More recently, popular
culture theories of audience reception have provided a needed
' To avoid confusion, I should add that all laws affect the availability of expressive
options. When the restriction of expressive options is not the governmentally desired as-
pect of the means or the end, it is incidental and does not violate the constitutional man-
date. For example, laws against murder restrict a form of expression but the law was
hardly adopted for that reason.
' The classic article in this tradition is Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, The
Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception, abridged version reprinted in James
Curran, et al, eds, Mass Communication and Society 349 (Edward Arnold, 1977).
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corrective to this transmission-belt theory in which the mass
media merely transferred an elite ideology to the minds of a
duped mass.' Although misguided when taken to the extreme
of denying that the author or the text exercise any influence on
what the audience receives, popular culture theories emphasize
the possibility of resistant readings, based on audiences' capacity
to reject dominant meanings, often replacing these meanings
with their own, against-the-grain interpretations. MacKinnon,
however, stays firmly within mass culture's transmission-belt
tradition. Pornographic content controls the reader, who has no
capacity to resist. "It [pornography] makes them [men] want to
[rape]" (p 19). "[Men [ I are made, changed, and impelled by
[pornography]" (p 15). Agency is reserved for pornography itself.
MacKinnon continually describes pornography as an actor, as
doing things. "It is restricted through what it does" (p 23; see
also pp 15, 38). "In pornography, pictures and words are sex" (p
26). In fact, the "[slexual words and pictures ... have sex" (p
58).65
Consistent with this, MacKinnon argues that a man who
raped and murdered a woman should not have been punished
under current law, which only holds people responsible for what
they choose to do, because the pornography was responsible (pp
95-97). But her lack of concern with the moral relevance of hu-
man agency allows her to suggest that we legislatively dispense
with the mens rea requirement so that both the man and the
pornographers can be held liable for what he did-the effect-and
not what he thought (p 96). Apparently, under this regime, if a
gunman threatened to shoot and kill two people unless they
" An excellent introduction within the legal literature to the debate between what I
have called mass culture and popular culture, and what he calls cultural pessimists and
cultural populists, is Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 Cal L Rev 125, 138-41 (1993) (citing much of the relevant litera-
ture). The elimination of agency in the mass culture approach, which is similar to
MacKinnon's descriptions, and agency's return in the popular culture approach is suggest-
ed in John Fiske's comment: "Earlier work... tended to show how the dominant ideology
reproduced itself invisibly and inevitably in the forms of popular television. [Stuart] Hall's
influential essay 'Decoding and Encoding'. . . opened up the idea that television programs
do not have a single meaning, but are relatively open texts, capable of being read in
different ways by different people." John Fiske, British Cultural Studies and Television, in
Robert C. Allen, ed, Channels of Discourse: Television and Contemporary Criticism 254,
260 (North Carolina, 1987) (emphasis added).
' After Mac~innon's warning not to read her metaphorically (p 11), I cannot resist
wondering, if the pictures do not use condoms and if the magazine is left for an appropri-
ate number of months, whether baby pornographic pictures will begin crawling out from
under the magazine's covers. See note 3.
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engage in sexual intercourse, and if the man and woman both
comply, the complying man can then be held for rape.
MacKinnon also hypothesizes a man who molests and kills a
little girl after consuming Penthouse, a set of events that she
describes as "linear causality" (p 37). After observing that this is
"only one effect of pornography," she rhetorically asks: "when
[pornography] has that effect, is restricting those pictures
'thought control'..." (p 37)? Despite her implication that the
answer is no, surely it is yes. Only someone blind to the notion of
autonomy could insist otherwise. If revolutionary advocacy pre-
dictably leads some listeners to revolutionary violence, would re-
stricting the speech be thought control?66 Yes! Or would prohib-
iting an activity out of fear that the experience of engaging in it
would lead the participants to perceive or approach the world
differently be thought control? Yes! Of course, thought control
might be justified. But rather than MacKinnon's suppression
approach, a legal regime that treats autonomy seriously holds the
person responsible for actions she undertakes after hearing these
words or having these experiences." As Brandeis argued, "the
deterrents ordinarily to be applied.., are education and punish-
ment for violation of the law .... 68
MacKinnon equally ignores agency in women. Nowhere does
she consider women who choose to write, produce, or appear in
' The traditional explanation for the distinction between the example in the text of
protected speech and speech that creates a clear and present danger is that restrictions
on the second are only justified because there is no time for the listener to hear or for
another speaker to offer a counter view-for "[ilf there be time .... the remedy... is
more speech .... " Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis and Holmes
concurring). Thus, in the clear-and-present-danger context, the restriction assertedly aids
thought rather than trying to control it. In contrast, in situations where there is a chance
for more speech, respect for the listener's thought requires that the speech be allowed no
matter how evil its influence. Holmes explained that "[ilf in the long run the beliefs
expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces
of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their
chance and have their way." Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes and
Brandeis dissenting).
' This is not to say that social policy should ignore potentially negative influences of
either advocacy or particular experiences. Rather, policymakers should try both to pro-
mote favorable experiences and to sponsor advocacy and experiences that reduce the
likelihood that a person will become criminal or anti-social. See, for example, Board of
Education v Pico, 457 US 853, 875-82 (1982) (Blackmun concurring). Although Blackmun
implicitly distinguishes the activities of purposeful promotion and suppression, he limited
his opinion to situations where the suppression "is motivated simply by the officials'
disapproval of the ideas involved." Id at 879-80. This limitation to suppression of "ideas"
may simply illustrate the grip that the marketplace-of-ideas rubric has on First Amend-
ment thought.
68 Whitney, 274 US at 378.
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pornography. Nor does she consider women who, as readers or
viewers, make affirmative use of pornography. In contrast, a
different version of feminism would emphasize the significance of
contesting traditional attitudes about sexuality and traditional
sexual definitions in a public sphere, the role of women challeng-
ing traditional conceptions, and the way suppression is inconsis-
tent with these initiatives.
Rejection of agency fits well with MacKinnon's constitutional
theories. As noted earlier, rather than interpret equal protection
as specifying improper goals and mandating governmental deci-
sions that respect people, the outcome-equality theory ignores
governmental purposes-that is, it ignores a "moral" evaluation
of collective "agency" and merely emphasizes effects. And out-
come-equality theory implicitly doubts the value of people mak-
ing political choices in that it overrides any choices that do not
adequately conform to constitutionally mandated outcomes. In
contrast, a constitutional mandate to respect people's equality
emphasizes agency. It holds the (governmental) actor responsible
for its decisions just like the mens rea requirement in criminal
law, which MacKinnon would abandon, holds individuals respon-
sible for their decisions, with liability not premised merely on
effects. Likewise, in contrast to the liberty theory, the market-
place-of-ideas theory, either in the classic or market failure ver-
sion, is unconcerned with whether protected speech represents a
person's autonomous choice.69 Similarly, in her constitutional
balancing, MacKinnon is able to hold pornography responsible for
the behavior of its readers or viewers only by rejecting their
autonomy.
In sum, neither MacKinnon's account of the world nor her
constitutional theories assign any role or significance to individu-
al agency or autonomy. This stance is hardly absurd. Policy mak-
ers sensibly assume that the environment has dramatic conse-
quences for individual behavior and, therefore, policy should be
directed at creating good environments. It would be absurd for
policy makers to rely solely on abstract autonomous individuals
to make the right choices irrespective of the constructed social
world in which they act. Rather, policy makers should use social
Compare First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765, 777 (1978) (invali-
dating a restriction on corporate campaign speech and observing that the "capacity [of
speech] for informing the public does not depend upon ... its source"), with id at 804-05
(White dissenting) (Corporate communications do not further "what some have considered
to be the principal function of the First Amendment, the use of communication as a
means of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment....").
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science or any other available aids to learn how various alterna-
tive legal regimes and institutional structures are likely to influ-
ence action; they should then adopt legal rules and create institu-
tions based on whether their influence will be, in the view of the
democratically responsive policy makers, desirable. That is, soci-
ology, or the stimulus-response psychology implicit in much eco-
nomic thinking, properly rules for purposes of social engineering.
Nevertheless, a central premise of morality, or more con-
cretely, of the attitude implicit in our constant interactions with
each other and in the way we evaluate people and their behavior,
is that people are responsible for their acts. The premise that
people can be responsible and should be permitted to exercise
self-determination underlies the liberal commitment to democra-
cy. A fundamental aspect of social life, a fundamental aspect of
how people relate, would be lost if people in their interactions
with each other did not treat a person's choices and acts as her
choices and acts. On the other hand, it would be sheer stupidity
to ignore, in the design and choice of legal or institutional ar-
rangements, the effects these frameworks have on people's be-
havior. If this is right, it must be that different arenas of social
life operate on fundamentally different premises about human
behavior.0
One understanding of constitutional guarantees of individual
rights is that they amount to a commitment to making policy
choices about institutional structures in a manner that guides,
but does not suppress, deny, or devalue individual choice. This
explains why, disdaining any absurd notion of neutrality, liberal'
constitutional doctrine allows the government to promote collec-
tive visions of the good but not by suppressing alternative vi-
sions. Effects theories ignore these distinctions. They cannot
distinguish a subsidy of practice A from the suppression of com-
peting practice B. From the perspective of respect for individual
autonomy, the difference is crucial. The first is appropriate gov-
ernmental action; the second is not.
Granting MacKinnon the importance of social engineering,"
7o See P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in P.F. Strawson, ed, Studies in the
Philosophy of Thought and Action 71-96 (Oxford, 1968).
"' "Social engineering" implies legal policy making that takes account of all human
concerns, usually within an effects-oriented utilitarian balancing analysis. The term en-
tered First Amendment theory with Steven Shiffrin's appropriation of Dean Roscoe
Pound's admonition. Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance
2 (Harvard, 1990). Here, my argument accepts the policy or legislative relevance of social
engineering even in respect to the "system of freedom of expression," to use Thomas
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the liberty theory of the First Amendment argues that any engi-
neering must take place in a manner consistent with respect for
individual autonomy.12 Anyone with an ultimate faith in peo-
ple-and in humanity-is likely to share the inevitably unprov-
able belief that legal regimes premised on respect for people's
agency will ultimately lead to the best results, the best society.
At least they are likely to share the belief that because life is a
continual process of becoming without final outcomes, this ap-
proach is the wisest way to live as we proceed.
Emerson's term, but the liberty theory, like Emerson, rejects the propriety of using social
engineering as a justification to restrict speech.
2 Jurgen Habermas makes a somewhat similar point when he radically distinguishes
the "lifeworld" from the differentiated out "systems," which are steered by specialized
media such as money and power, and argues for the importance of not allowing the
functionalist reason of system realms to colonize the lifeworld. Jurgen Habermas, 2 The
Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist
Reason (Beacon Press, 1987).
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